Dual-Process Theory
The foundation of KahneBench: understanding how fast (System 1) and slow (System 2) thinking create cognitive biases.
The Two Systems
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman's dual-process theory, developed with Amos Tversky, distinguishes between two fundamentally different modes of thinking that govern human judgment and decision-making.
System 1: Fast Thinking
- • Automatic - operates effortlessly
- • Intuitive - relies on heuristics
- • Parallel - processes multiple inputs simultaneously
- • Unconscious - operates below awareness
- • Emotional - influenced by affect
"What you see is all there is" (WYSIATI)
System 2: Slow Thinking
- • Controlled - requires effort
- • Analytical - follows rules and logic
- • Serial - processes step-by-step
- • Conscious - aware of reasoning
- • Rational - applies deliberate analysis
"Think twice before you act"
Why This Matters for LLMs
Large Language Models can exhibit behavior analogous to both systems:
- System 1-like behavior: Quick pattern matching, surface-level associations, susceptibility to framing effects and anchoring.
- System 2-like behavior: Chain-of-thought reasoning, careful analysis, ability to override initial impressions with deliberate calculation.
KahneBench specifically tests for situations where an LLM's "System 1" produces biased responses, and measures its capacity for "System 2" override through debiasing prompts.
Key Concepts
Heuristics
Mental shortcuts that System 1 uses to make quick judgments. While often useful, they can lead to systematic errors (biases) in certain situations.
Attribute Substitution
When faced with a difficult question, System 1 often substitutes an easier question. For example, substituting "How do I feel about this?" for "What do I think about this?"
Cognitive Ease
System 1 favors information that is easy to process. Familiar, clear, and frequently repeated information feels more true and trustworthy.
References
- Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124-1131.
- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263-291.